Barry and Jiten took New Venture Creation, and developed the business plan for Qcue as part of the class. They went onto compete in Moot Corp and raised $327,000 in seed money. Since then they have significant venture capital and customer traction. See the details here;
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/business/stories/technology/2009/10/19/1019plugged.html
Previous post: Microsoft goes from Evil Empire to Laggard
Next post: Moot Corp Participant Leverages Efforts into Not For Profit
I’m an experienced entrepreneur, active investor, author, strategy consultant, and on the faculty of the Management Department at the University of Texas at Austin's McCombs School of Business, where I teach in the MBA program and am Director of Texas Venture Labs and the Global Moot Corp Program. Full bio…
{ 2 comments… read them below or add one }
Over the past few months, I have learned a great deal about dynamic pricing and its effect on both the primary and secondary ticket markets. While i strongly believe in dynamic pricing and in Qcue’s business idea, it is safe to say that it still has a ways to go. These problems are two fold. First, teams live and die with their season ticket holders, who strongly dislike the idea of teams using dynamic pricing. Why should they spend a great deal of money up-front on season tickets if other fans can literally purchase seats right next to them the day of the game for much less? As teams begin to utilize dynamic pricing, it must also invest in ensuring that season ticket holders are receiving truly differentiated experiences while at the game to minimize this backlash (i.e. free gifts, merchandise, tours, or interaction with the players). Second, one could argue dynamic pricing has existed for years as secondary ticket companies (ticket city, etc) purchase tons of tickets at face value from teams (up to 10% of seats for some teams) and then sell them on the open market via a dynamic pricing model that street scalpers have understood for decades. Does Qcue’s model hurt the secondary market? Is Qcue a competitor or a complement to this market and how do they interact going forward.
Over the past few months, I have learned a great deal about dynamic pricing and its effect on both the primary and secondary ticket markets. While i strongly believe in dynamic pricing and in Qcue’s business idea, it is safe to say that it still has a ways to go. These problems are two fold. First, teams live and die with their season ticket holders, who strongly dislike the idea of teams using dynamic pricing. Why should they spend a great deal of money up-front on season tickets if other fans can literally purchase seats right next to them the day of the game for much less? As teams begin to utilize dynamic pricing, it must also invest in ensuring that season ticket holders are receiving truly differentiated experiences while at the game to minimize this backlash (i.e. free gifts, merchandise, tours, or interaction with the players). Second, one could argue dynamic pricing has existed for years as secondary ticket companies (ticket city, etc) purchase tons of tickets at face value from teams (up to 10% of seats for some teams) and then sell them on the open market via a dynamic pricing model that street scalpers have understood for decades. Does Qcue’s model hurt the secondary market? Is Qcue a competitor or a complement to this market and how do they interact going forward.